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Uncharted Waters: Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Disputes after D.R. Horton
Michael Mangels1
I: Introduction
Michael Cuda went to work as a superintendent for a home building company named
D.R. Horton in 2005.2 In 2006, D.R. Horton required each new and current employee, including
Mr. Cuda, to sign a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA), which provided that “all disputes and
claims relating to the employee’s employment with Respondent will be determined exclusively
by final and binding arbitration.”3 Generally, employment arbitration is a hearing where both
parties present their cases in front of a neutral fact finder.4 The neutral fact finder then makes a
decision as to which party’s position is correct. An arbitrator’s decision is generally binding on
both parties, but the effect of the decision is determined by the agreement of the parties.
Arbitration is a way to resolve disputes through contract as opposed to a court.5

It is

distinguishable from a courtroom trial, because the formalities, such as rules of evidence and
various discovery procedures, can be, and generally are, waived through the underlying
arbitration agreement. In arbitration, an arbitrator is limited to interpreting the contract; not
fulfilling the role of a judge.6
In the case of D.R. Horton, the MAA stated that the individual could not consolidate his
claims with another employee, and that the arbitrator could not provide class-based relief.7 In
2008, Mr. Cuda felt that he had been misclassified as an “exempt employee” under the Fair
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Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and was thereby denied his right to overtime under the FLSA.8 As
a result, he hired a lawyer who attempted to initiate arbitration on both his behalf and the entire
class of similarly situated superintendents.9 In response to Mr. Cuda’s notice of intent to initiate
arbitration, the employer, D.R. Horton, maintained that Mr. Cuda’s lawyer did not file an
effective notice of intent to arbitrate because the arbitration agreement did not recognize class
claims.10 Due to the lack of coverage, Mr. Cuda would have been forced to pursue his FLSA
claim individually in arbitration.
Instead of accepting the individual arbitration procedure, Mr. Cuda attempted to attack
the agreement.11 Specifically, in November of 2008, Mr. Cuda filed an Unfair Labor Practice
with the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”).12 The Board issued a complaint, and
after a November 2010 trial, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the agreement
unenforceable. First, the judge found that the MAA did not violate Section 8(a)(1)13 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by prohibiting class or collective litigation.14 Second, the
judge found that D.R. Horton did violate Section 8(a)(4)15 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA through the
MAA because the text of the MAA would reasonably lead employees to believe that they were
not able to file charges with the Board.16
Both the employer, D.R. Horton, and the Board’s General Counsel appealed the
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decision.17 In January of 2012, the Board ruled to uphold the Judge’s finding of the 8(a)(4)
violation because employees could reasonably interpret the MAA to interfere with access to the
Board.18 The Board, however, reversed the Judge’s decision that the class action waiver was not
a violation of Section 8(a)(1).19 Instead, the Board held that the class waiver was a restriction on
employees’ right under the NLRA to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . .
mutual aid or protection.”20
D.R. Horton appealed both of the Board’s holdings to the Fifth Circuit.21 While the Fifth
Circuit will be deciding both questions, this note will only consider whether the class waiver
violates § 8(a)(1). The Board’s decision in D.R. Horton must now be a part of any discussion of
enforceability of a class action waiver. This note will be directed to that question.
If the class waiver was a simple contract and not contained within the MAA, the question
would be much easier. Due to the class waiver’s inclusion within an arbitration agreement, this
case implicates another federal statute in addition to the NLRA. The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) provides that “[a] written provision . . . evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 22

Various legal

challenges to agreements to arbitrate have reached the Supreme Court.23 The agreements have
been challenged for being inconsistent with the administrative enforcement scheme,24 too
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complex to arbitrate,25 or for amounting to a waiver of rights that is unconscionable.26 In all of
these cases, the Supreme Court enforced the arbitration agreement over the particular objection.27
Specifically, the Supreme Court has said that an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim will be
enforced unless “Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies.”28 The Court has stated that there are multiple ways to discover Congress’s intention29
not to permit arbitration including: an examination of the statutory text; the legislative history;
or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.30
This leaves Mr. Cuda in murky waters. Although he has a right under the NLRA to
challenge his classification as an “exempt employee” through collective activity, the MAA that
he signed limits him to individual action.31 Therefore his right under the NLRA to challenge his
classification through collective legal activity is in tension with the FAA’s preference to enforce
the MAA that he signed as written. The question is whether the NLRA qualifies as one of those
grounds “as exist at law or in equity” that warrant an exception to the FAA’s preference toward
enforcement, and make the agreement unenforceable. If the MAA was found unenforceable, Mr.
Cuda would have an opportunity to challenge his employment classification through some sort of
collective legal action.32
This comment will consider the most recent, and likely most significant, challenge to the
FAA. Part II will explain the FAA, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, and when a valid
arbitration agreement is not enforceable. Next, Part III will explain Section 7 of the NLRA and

25

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
27
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 473 U.S. at 628; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20; Concepcion 131 S. Ct. at 1740 (2011).
28
Mitsubishi Motors Corp 473 U.S. at 628.
29
See Gilmer 500 U.S. at 26.
30
Id.
31
See D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 187, *1 (2012).
32
Cf. id. (holding that employees have a right to engage in collective legal action dealing with terms and conditions
of employment.)
26

4

begin to define the conflict between Section 7’s protection of concerted activity and the FAA’s
preference for individual arbitration. Then, Part IV will explain the NLRB’s decision in D.R.
Horton that class waivers in arbitration agreements signed as a condition of employment are
unenforceable as a violation of employees’ labor rights. Part V will describe and analyze court
decisions that have considered the Board’s holding in D.R. Horton.

Finally, Part VI will

conclude that the Fifth Circuit should affirm the Board’s decision when it considers it on appeal.
II: The Federal Arbitration Act and Pro-Arbitration Policy
A. Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act.
The operative clause of the FAA reads, “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”33 Additionally, much like agreements to arbitrate contract disputes, agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims are also enforceable by courts.34 The Supreme Court has held that an
agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim is enforceable unless Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.35 While many parties have turned to
arbitration to solve disputes, many others have challenged the enforceability of various types of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.36
B. Legal Challenges to the Federal Arbitration Act
While numerous challenges to arbitration agreements have reached the Supreme Court,
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the most significant cases with respect to the pending challenge in D.R. Horton are Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and Compucredit Corp. v.
Greenwood.
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.37
A Japanese and Swiss joint venture disputed an agreement to ship and sell automobiles
with a Puerto Rican company, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.38
After the dispute arose, the Japanese and Swiss joint venture sued to compel arbitration pursuant
to the agreement between the parties.39 The Puerto Rican company counter-claimed alleging,
among other claims, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.40 The District Court granted the
joint venture’s motion to compel arbitration of all the issues presented by the dispute, including
the antitrust issues.41 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reversed the order to
compel arbitration of the antitrust claims.42 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue.43
The Supreme Court held that the language of parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes
should be read broadly to favor the arbitration of issues.44 The Court clarified that the general
presumption that there is a presumption that arbitration agreements cover all disputes including
rights provided through statute.45 The Court, while holding that agreements should be read
broadly to include statutory rights within the agreement of what can be arbitrated, clarified that
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Congress can make agreements to arbitrate any statutory claim unenforceable.46 If Congress
intends to include protection against waiving a judicial forum, it will make that intention clear
either in the text of the statute or in the legislative history.47 Thus, once a party makes an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute over a statutory right, it should be enforced unless Congress
intended to prohibit the waiver of judicial remedies.48
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected certain attacks on agreements to arbitrate statutory
disputes.49

While an arbitration agreement that resulted from “fraud, undue influence, or

overweening bargaining power” would be unenforceable, the Court would not assume that every
arbitration agreement results from those inequities.50 Additionally, the Court would not presume
that arbitration panels either lack the ability to effectively arbitrate a matter or that they will be
hostile to a party.51 Finally, the fact that a statute contains an important public policy does not
itself make the statute inappropriate for arbitration.52

“So long as the prospective litigant

effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”53
After Mitsubishi, it was clear that the mere presence of a right within a statute was
insufficient to defeat an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over that right. 54 The Court, however,
made it equally clear that it would not enforce any arbitration agreement.55 Two aspects of this
decision are crucial to the pending case of D.R. Horton. First, the Court made clear that some

46

Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
48
Id.
49
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 632˗639.
50
Id. at 627.
51
Id. at 633˗634.
52
Id. at 634˗637.
53
Id. at 637.
54
Id.
55
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627˗628
47

7

statutory rights may be unavailable for arbitration, if Congress makes that intent clear. 56 Second,
the Court explicitly held that traditional defenses to contracts such as fraud and duress apply
even to arbitration agreements.57
2. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Gilmer, the Plaintiff in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., thought that his
employer terminated him on account of his age.58

Before the dispute arose, the plaintiff

registered with the New York Stock Exchange, which was required in order for him to secure
employment.59 Included in the plaintiff’s registration application with the Stock Exchange was
an agreement to arbitrate any dispute with his employer arising out of employment or
termination of employment.60 Plaintiff was terminated at the age of sixty-two and filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming a violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).61 Plaintiff then brought suit against Interstate, his
employer, alleging a violation of the ADEA.62 Interstate moved to compel arbitration.63 The
District Court denied the motion, but the Fourth Circuit reversed because it did not find that
Congress intended to preclude enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under the ADEA.64
Plaintiff argued that the compulsory arbitration of claims would be inconsistent with the
statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA.65 Specifically, he argued that enforcing the
arbitration agreement would undermine the important social policy advanced by the ADEA of
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preventing discrimination.66

Plaintiff also claimed that enforcing the arbitration agreement

would undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA.67

Additionally, plaintiff

contended that Congress provided a judicial forum for the ADEA, and therefore compulsory
arbitration is improper because it deprived individuals of this forum.68
The Supreme Court rejected all of plaintiff’s arguments. First, the Court made clear that
although arbitration focuses on specific disputes, judicial resolution of a claim also focuses on
the specific dispute in front of the court.69 Both of these mechanisms to resolve disputes can
further important social policies;70 so long as a claimant can still pursue her cause of action in
some forum, the statute still serves its remedial and deterrent functions.71
Secondly, the Supreme Court was not persuaded that enforcing an arbitration agreement
would interfere with an executive agency’s role in enforcing a statute.72 Prior to the EEOC
bringing a suit, the agency is tasked with using “informal methods of conciliation, conference,
and persuasion” to bring about voluntary compliance with the statute. 73 Additionally, even if
someone is subject to an arbitration agreement, she is still free to file a charge with the EEOC.74
Also, the EEOC is not limited to enforcement actions by individuals who file charges with the
agency; the EEOC has independent authority to investigate claims of discrimination.75
Furthermore, the Court found that there was no evidence that Congress intended to
preclude waiver of the judicial forum under the statute.76 The Court stated that had Congress

66
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intended to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, it would have been
made clear in either the text or legislative history.77 Instead, the Court found that Congress
intended for parties to resolve claims flexibly.78

The Court again cited to the legislative

provision that requires the EEOC to first pursue voluntary compliance prior to initiating
proceedings against an employer.79

Plaintiff could not establish that Congress intended to

protect the right to a judicial forum against waiver, and there was a great deal of evidence that
Congress intended to encourage informal settlement over judicial proceedings.
Plaintiff advanced a second attack against the arbitration agreement. He argued that the
procedural protections provided by arbitration were inconsistent with the ADEA.80 First, he
argued that the arbitration panels would be biased.81 He also argued that the limited discovery
provided by arbitration would be insufficient to prove discrimination.82 In addition, he argued
that a failure to issue written opinions will undermine both public knowledge of employer
practices and the ability to obtain effective appellate review of an arbitration panel’s decision.83
Finally, he challenged arbitration procedures because they generally do not provide for broad
equitable relief or class actions.84
The Supreme Court rejected these attacks, and made clear that it will not strike down
arbitration agreements based on assumptions about insufficient procedural protections within
arbitration, because they “are far out of step with [the Court’s] current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.”85

77
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Id. at 29.
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As to plaintiff’s claim of bias, the Court refused to entertain a presumption of bias.86
Additionally, the New York Stock Exchange rules, which governed Gilmer’s specific arbitration
agreement, contained protections against biased panels.87 The parties were to be informed of the
arbitrators’ backgrounds, and each party was allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited
challenges for cause.88 Finally, there was no need to prospectively protect against bias because
courts can overturn decisions of arbitrators where there is “evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators.”89
The Court was also deeply skeptical about the discovery argument90 because the Court
could not see why discrimination claims needed more extensive discovery than claims under
either the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) or the Sherman Antitrust
Act, both of which it had previously held were arbitrable.91 In plaintiff’s case, the agreement
provided various discovery type protections. For example, the rules that governed plaintiff’s
arbitration with the New York Stock Exchange provided for document production, information
requests, depositions, and subpoenas, making the permissible discovery quite extensive and less
problematic.92 Finally, the Court explained that part of the tradeoff for more limited discovery is
the increased simplicity, informality, and expeditious nature of the proceedings. 93 Additionally,
the court held that even if an agreement did not require a written opinion, that alone was not a
reason to find an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim unenforceable.94
Plaintiff also attacked arbitration agreements contained in employment agreements more
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broadly.95 Gilmer argued that employers and employees will frequently have unequal bargaining
power.96 He argued that due to this inequality, arbitration agreements arising out of employment
relationships should not be enforced.97
The Court also held that this was insufficient to strike down the agreement. Mere
inequality in bargaining power is not enough to hold that employment arbitration agreements are
never enforceable.98 While courts should still strike down an agreement if it resulted from “the
sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of
any contract,”99 there is no per se rule that an arbitration agreement in an employment context is
unenforceable.100
The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument claiming that the agreement was
unenforceable because it did not provide for class action. The Court held that any concerns
about collective action were not implicated in Gilmer because the rules of arbitration through the
Stock Exchange did not limit the type of relief that an arbitrator could provide, and in fact the
rules explicitly allowed for collective proceedings.101

The Court stated that “even if the

arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be granted by the
arbitrator, the fact that the ADEA provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does
not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred;”102 however, it also
noted that these agreements would not bar the EEOC from bringing an action seeking class-wide
and equitable relief.103

95

See id. at 32˗33.
Id. at 32˗33.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 33.
99
Id.
100
Gilmer 500 U.S. at 33.
101
Id. at 32.
102
Id.
103
Id.
96

12

The collective action language is likely the most significant for D.R. Horton. However, it
is important to note two things. First, plaintiff was suing in his individual capacity and therefore
the issue was not before the court. Additionally, the provision involved in the ADEA is an opt-in
provision as opposed to a non-waivable provision like Section 8(a)(1).104
Consequently, as a result of Gilmer, a court will only refuse to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate a right contained within a federal statute if (1) the defense is one that applies to a
contract at law, or (2) if Congress intended to prohibit waiver of a judicial forum.105 Moreover,
the court left open three ways to discover this intention: legislative text, legislative history, or an
“inherent conflict” between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.106
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion107
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the plaintiffs attacked a consumer arbitration
agreement.108 The agreement required that all relevant disputes be arbitrated and could only be
brought in the disputant’s individual capacity.109

Plaintiffs sued as a class alleging

misrepresentation of phone prices, and AT&T moved to compel arbitration.110 The District
Court denied the motion based on California’s doctrine of unconscionability.111 The doctrine
had three requirements: (1) a consumer contract of adhesion;112 (2) involving predictably small
amounts of money; and (3) a plaintiff must allege that the party with superior bargaining power
executed a scheme to “deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small

104
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sums of money.”113 If those three requirements are met, then, according to California, the
agreement works to exempt the party from responsibility for its conduct, and is therefore
unconscionable.114
The plaintiffs argued that because the class waiver doctrine applies both to arbitration
agreements and to contracts regulating lawsuits, the FAA did not apply.115 The Court rejected
this argument.116

First, it expanded the application of the FAA, stating that the FAA’s

preemptive effect may extend “even to grounds traditionally thought to exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”117 The Court compared the instant situation to a doctrine that
found agreements unconscionable if they did not provide for judicially monitored discovery.118
Thus, it expanded the analysis to preclude doctrines that not only directly target arbitration, but
also those that would disproportionately affect arbitration agreements.119 Ultimately, the FAA
was interpreted to prohibit a state’s preference for procedures that are incompatible with
arbitration, due to preemption.120
Next, the Court expansively defined the purpose of the FAA as ensuring that arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms in order to facilitate streamlined proceedings.121
Because class proceedings require procedural protections, it is inconsistent with the fundamental
attributes of arbitration, and therefore a doctrine prohibiting class waivers is pre-empted by the
FAA.122 As a result, while the savings clause of the FAA permits defenses to contracts as exist
at law or equity, that clause does not apply to contract defenses based in state law that have a
113
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disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.123
4. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood124
In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood plaintiffs attacked an agreement to arbitrate a
dispute in a credit repair service agreement.125 The plaintiffs sued in district court under the
Credit Repair Organizations Act, and the company moved to compel arbitration.126 The court
denied the motion, concluding that Congress intended claims under the Credit Repair
Organizations Act to be non-arbitrable.127
The Supreme Court on review, reiterated that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims
should be enforced according to their terms even if the claim is based on a federal statute.128
Congress can override the FAA’s presumption, however, if it gives a contrary command.129
The plaintiffs in CompuCredit asserted that Congress gave that contrary command,
focusing on the specific language in the statute.130 One provision in the statute required that a
credit repair organization provide a statement to the consumer prior to executing a contract.131
One sentence in that statement read: “[Y]ou have a right to sue a credit repair organization that
violates the Credit Repair Organization Act.”132 Another provision in the statute read that any
waiver by any consumer of any “protection provided by or any right of the consumer under this
subchapter” (1) shall be treated as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State
court or any other person.133

123
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125
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Despite this language, the Supreme Court found no Congressional intent to preclude
waiver of a judicial forum.134 It determined that the right created by the statute was a right to
receive the statement outlining the rights within the statute, not the right to bring an action in a
court.135 Additionally, the use of words such as “action,” “class action,” and “court” are not
sufficient even when used throughout a statute to create a non-waivable right to a judicial
forum.136
C. Summary of the Defenses
Despite these decisions and many others challenging arbitration agreements that apply to
statutory claims, the Court has left open a few avenues of attack. First, Congress can prohibit
parties from waiving judicial remedies for particular federal statutory rights.137 Congress does
not have to do this explicitly in the text of the statute; Congressional intent can be found in an
act’s text, the legislative history, or “an inherent conflict between arbitration and [the statute’s]
underlying purposes.”138 The Court has recently raised the bar for this defense, and requires a
contrary congressional demand.139 Second, an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim can be
attacked based on “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”140 In
fact, the Court specifically left open defenses based on fraud and duress.141 While generally
applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability are available as a
defense against an arbitration agreement, agreements cannot be invalidated by defenses that
“apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate
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is at issue.”142 Given that class treatment is inconsistent with the FAA’s policy of enforcing
arbitration agreements according to their terms, states cannot coerce class arbitration through its
doctrine of unconscionability.143
Two defenses are available to the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate a statutory
right.

First, arbitration agreements are automatically unenforceable if Congress precluded

waiver of the right under the statute.144 Importantly, the right must be a covered right under the
statute, and not merely a right to have a claim heard.145 If the only right being waived is the right
to a judicial forum, then Congress must use explicit language that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are unenforceable for the specific statutory claims at issue.146 Absent such explicit
language, an arbitration agreement is enforceable.147 The Supreme Court has not held that any
statutory right can be waived by an arbitration agreement. Instead, the Court generally finds that
no statutory right is at issue.148 It will classify the provision as a forum selection question, and
will enforce the agreement.149 The remaining defense is grounds as exist at law or in equity.150
If the source of the legal or equitable ground is state law, however, it cannot be based on a mere
distaste for arbitration.151 Thus, while a state cannot pass a law, or hold a common law doctrine
that is inconsistent with the FAA, presumably Congress may still pass a statute that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the FAA, making an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable in
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certain circumstances.152
III: Section 7: Concerted Activity and Legal Action
A. Overview of Section 7 Protection
For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant provision of the NLRA is Section 7,
which grants statutory employees153 the right to engage in concerted activities for the “purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”154 The Board requires two elements for
activity to be protected under the statute.155
First the activity must be “concerted.”156 There are two types of “concerted” activities.157
Action by a group is always a type of concerted activity,158 but action by an individual can also
be considered “concerted.”159 The applicable test is whether an activity is engaged in “with or
on the authority of other employees,” and not “solely on behalf of the employee himself.”160
This leaves two types of individual action covered by the term “concerted.” One type of
individual action is where an individual employee seeks to initiate or prepare for group action.161
This includes actions such as circulating a petition, or simply discussing the possibility of
initiating group action with another employee.162 Additionally, “concerted activity” includes
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situations where an individual brings a group complaint to the attention of management.163 To
qualify under this category, the individual employee must at a minimum engage in discussions
with other employees, even though there is no explicit requirement that the individual be
“authorized” to speak on behalf of others in some formal agency sense.164 In fact, even if the
group initiating the complaint in the presence of the individual employee does not know what the
employee plans to do, the activity may still be “concerted.”165
Second, the activity must be for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”166 This phrase
reaches activities by employees that seek to improve working conditions.167 The phrase also has
a broad reach in terms of where the activity takes place. The Supreme Court, in Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, has held that Congress did not wish to limit the statute’s protection to concerted activity
that took place within the immediate employer-employee relationship.168 This is why Congress
included the broader language of “mutual aid or protection” after it had used both “selforganization” and “collective bargaining” within Section 7 of the NLRA.169 The Court explicitly
held that the NLRA protects employees from retaliation by their employer when they attempt to
improve working conditions by using either a judicial or administrative forum.170
B. Section 7 and D.R. Horton
The above two sections have set up the potential conflict. The MAA at issue in D.R.
Horton prohibited individuals from pursuing any dispute resolution channel other than
arbitration that was agreed upon in the MAA.171

163

In that agreement, the employees were

Id at 886.
See Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1288 (6th Cir. 1998).
165
Meyers Industries, 281 N.L.R.B. at 886.
166
See Hodges, supra note 155 at 187.
167
See Hodges, supra note 155 at 196; Eastex, Inc v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978).
168
Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565.
169
Id. at 567.
170
Id. at 566.
171
D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 187, *1 (2012).
164

19

prohibited from consolidating claims.172 When Mr. Cuda filed his notice of intent to arbitrate his
dispute, he alleged that he was denied his statutory right to overtime due to being misclassified
as “exempt.”173 Consequently, his suit, which was seeking additional pay, sought to improve his
working conditions by restoring his right to overtime pay.174 As a result, this action fell within
the “for the purpose of mutual aid and protection” prong because it was directed to improve
working conditions.

175

Additionally, he filed a notice of intent to arbitrate representing a class

of “similarly situated superintendents.”176 This suit was therefore “concerted” because it was an
action by an individual employee seeking to initiate or prepare for group action.177 Although the
MAA prohibited action within the protection of Section 7 of the NLRA, the question in front of
the Board was whether the presence of an arbitration agreement, and therefore the federal policy
promoting individual arbitration of disputes, meant that the Section 7 restriction was somehow
lawful.
IV: D.R. Horton -- Collective Action and Arbitration Agreements
A. Facts of the Case
D. R. Horton was a homebuilder with operations in multiple states.178 In 2006, it decided
to condition employment on the signing of the MAA.179 The MAA provided (1) that all disputes
relating to employment will be determined by final and binding arbitration, (2) that the arbitrator
only had the authority to hear the claims of an individual employee and could not consolidate
claims of employees or fashion relief as a class or group of employees in one proceeding, and (3)
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that the signatory employee waived the right to file a lawsuit or other civil remedy.180
Michael Cuda, employed by D.R. Horton as a superintendent, decided to challenge his
status as “exempt”181 from the protections of the FLSA.182 His attorney gave notice of intent to
initiate arbitration on behalf of Michael Cuda and a nationwide class of similarly situated
superintendents.183 The employer responded that the notice was ineffective, citing the provision
of the MAA stating that the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not
have the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a
group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding.”184 Michael Cuda then filed an Unfair
Labor Practice charge with the Board.185 The ALJ found that the Employer violated Section
8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA186 because the MAA’s language could be reasonably interpreted to
prohibit access to the Board’s procedures.187 The ALJ did not find that the MAA violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA188

because there was no direct Board precedent, and recent

Supreme Court pronouncements made it clear that arbitration was a matter of consent.189
Consequently, the ALJ did not find that the MAA’s bar of class or collective activity itself
violated the Act.190
B. The Board’s Holding that Class Action Waivers Contained in Arbitration Agreements
are Unfair Labor Practices
The Board reached its holding under a multi-step process. First, it found that employees
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have a right to engage in class-wide or collective litigation either in court or before an
arbitrator.191

Second, the MAA, which constituted a workplace rule, explicitly prohibited

exercising this type of protected activity, making it unlawful.192 Third, it held that the fact that
the employee agreed to the restriction of Section 7 activity was irrelevant to the analysis because
Section 7 rights are not waivable by contract.193 Fourth, the Board found that its holding was not
in conflict with the FAA194 because the FAA expressly permits traditional equitable and legal
defenses to their enforceability.195
1. Section 7 Protects Class-Wide or Collective Litigation and Arbitration
The Board began by clarifying that employees have a right to engage in collective or
class-wide litigation, which is protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.196 Section 7’s protection
extends beyond the workplace,197 and in fact, the court expressly stated that employees are
protected when they resort to administrative or judicial forums.198
Furthermore, Section 7 extends beyond judicial and administrative forums, and includes
advancing a collective workplace grievance through arbitration.199 This would be true either if a
collective bargaining agreement created an arbitration procedure, or if the procedure was
unilaterally imposed by the employer, as was the case in D.R. Horton.200 If the employee was
pursuing a collective workplace grievance through an arbitration mechanism that was created
through a collective bargaining agreement, it would be considered an “ongoing process of
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employee concerted activity.”201 In the present case, however, the employee was attempting to
advance a grievance about misclassification that affected numerous employees through an
arbitration mechanism that was unilaterally imposed by the employer. 202 The pursuit of the
grievance was “concerted,” and therefore the employee’s activity was protected, because a single
individual advanced the grievance attempting to initiate group action.203
2. Section 8(a)(1) Makes Restrictions of the Right to Collective or Class
Litigation and Arbitration Unlawful
Section 7 of the NLRA protects the pursuit of collective workplace grievances through
either litigation or arbitration.204 Section 8(a)(1) of NLRA goes further and makes it unlawful
for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in” Section 7.205
In D.R. Horton, employment was conditioned on signing the MAA, so the Board
analyzed the MAA as a unilaterally imposed workplace rule.206 There is a two-step inquiry for
unilaterally imposed workplace rules.207 The first inquiry is whether the rule explicitly restricts
Section 7 activity.208 If it does, the rule is unlawful.209 If the rule does not explicitly restrict
Section 7 activities, then a reviewing party would analyze whether: (1) employees would
reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7
rights.210 If any of those three factors are met, then the rule is unlawful.211
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The Board held that the MAA explicitly restricted Section 7 activity, and was therefore
unlawful.212 This was a straightforward holding for the Board. Section 7 provided a right to
engage in either collective litigation or arbitration.213 The MAA, which was a unilaterally
imposed workplace rule, expressly prohibited both by mandating that all claims go to arbitration
and by prohibiting the arbitrator from consolidating claims.214 As a result, the MAA expressly
restricted Section 7 activity.
3. Section 7 Rights Cannot be Waived by Individual Agreements
The fact that the employee agreed to the MAA was irrelevant to the Board’s analysis.215
The Board began its discussion by citing four cases where it held that individual contracts where
the employee gave up Section 7 rights were unlawful even when the employee received valuable
consideration, such as subscriptions to a stock purchase plan.216 Then, the Board proceeded to
discuss two different Supreme Court cases that held that individual contracts that restrict rights
under the NLRA are unenforceable.217 In National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,218 the Court held that a
contract that simply discouraged a discharged employee from presenting a grievance “through a
labor organization or his chosen representative, or in any way except personally” was
unenforceable and unlawful because it was a means of avoiding the NLRA’s policy.219 The
Court stated that employers cannot frustrate the NLRA by “inducing their workmen to agree not
to demand performance of the duties which it imposes.”220
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The Court later reaffirmed this principle in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,221 stating that
“wherever private contracts conflict with the Board’s functions of preventing unfair labor
practices, they obviously must yield or the [NLRA] would be reduced to a futility.”222 In fact,
the Board had decided a case with similar facts much earlier. In J.H. Stone & Sons,223 the Board
held an arbitration clause unlawful.224 There, the employment agreement required the employee
to agree to individually arbitrate any claim in the event of continued disagreement with her
employer.225 The Board struck down the agreement reasoning that it denied the employee the
right to act collectively at the earliest stage of the dispute, and compelled the employee to pit her
“individual bargaining strength against the superior bargaining power of the employer.”226
The fact that the employees retained other rights protected by Section 7 is insufficient to
save the MAA.227 For example, any agreement where an employee not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement waives the right to strike is unlawful.228 It does not matter if the employer
permits the employee to bring forward grievances, petition to improve working conditions, or
simply engage in discussions with other employees.229 Once the employer forces the employees
to give up their right to strike, the agreement is per se unlawful. 230 Just as the strike is a means
for realizing the demands protected by Section 7 through the exertion of collective pressure and
equalizing bargaining positions, so too is engaging in collective litigation or arbitration.
4. The Board’s Holding Does Not Conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act
Finally, the Board held that its decision that the MAA was an unlawful restriction of
221

J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, *6 (2012) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944)).
223
J.H. Stone & Sons, 33 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1941).
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at *8.
228
Id.
229
See id.
230
Id.
222

25

Section 7 activity did not conflict with the FAA or the liberal pro-arbitration policy implied
under the FAA.231 While courts are not required to defer to this holding, as it is outside of the
Board’s realm of expertise,232 the Board’s reasoning is instructive nonetheless.
The Board stated that the purpose of the FAA was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements and to place them on the same footing as other contracts.233
The Board conceded that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration.”234 Despite this, the Board recognized that arbitration
agreements to resolve statutory claims in an arbitral forum are not enforceable if a party forgoes
the substantive rights given by the statute.235 The Board found that there was no conflict
between the FAA and the NLRA, in the alternative it reasoned that if there was a conflict
between the two statutes, the NLRA’s protection should lead to non-enforcement of the MAA.236
The Board advanced three arguments in support of its holding that the FAA was not in conflict
with the NLRA.237
First, the Board argued that recognizing a right under Section 7 did not uniquely affect
arbitration, and therefore did not frustrate the purpose of the FAA.238 The Board reached this
conclusion through a two-step process.239 First, it narrowly defined the pro-arbitration policy of
the FAA as preventing courts from treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other
private contracts.240 Next, it cited and discussed prior court precedent, finding that when private
contracts conflict with the NLRA, they must yield to the NLRA or the NLRA would be reduced
231
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to a futility.241 Moreover, the Board found that the MAA would have been just as unlawful if it
allowed access to the courts but required that all litigation claims be pursued individually.242
Since the agreement would have been unlawful had it said nothing about arbitration, the Board
found that its holding did not undermine the strong pro-arbitration policy of the FAA.243
The Board did not enforce the agreement for a second reason; the MAA actually
precluded the exercise of substantive rights under federal law.244 While Congress intended the
FAA to compel courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, the Board
found that the savings clause contained in the FAA245 allowed for defenses in law and equity.246
Given that the employees here were being required to waive rights guaranteed to them under the
NLRA, the Board found that these rights were not merely procedural, but constituted “the core
substantive right protected by the NLRA.”247 The Board read Gilmer to preclude enforcement of
an arbitration agreement, if enforcement would require waiving a statutory right.248 While
Gilmer upheld an agreement to arbitrate a claim under a statute that involved a provision that
provided for a collective action, the Board distinguished Gilmer on its facts, indicating that the
claim in Gilmer was an individual claim.249

Thus, Gilmer’s holding that employees can

effectively vindicate their statutory rights under the ADEA through arbitration is inapplicable to
the MAA’s legality.250 Instead, the Board clarified that the relevant question was whether
employers can condition employment on employees waiving their statutory right to engage in
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collective legal action on matters that touch terms and conditions of employment.251
Third, the Board held that in accommodating the competing policies,252 the substantive
rights provided by the NLRA outweigh the interest promoted by the FAA in an employment
arbitration agreement, and therefore, which weighed in favor of non-enforcement of the MAA.253
It was in this context of the balancing that the Board considered the Norris-LaGuardia Act.254
The Board interpreted Section 8(a)(1)’s provision making employer restriction of collective
action unlawful as an extension of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s prohibition of “yellow-dog
contracts,” which coerced employees to agree not to join a union in exchange for employment.255
The Board found that the Norris La-Guardia Act “manifested a strong federal policy protecting
employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted action, including collective pursuit of
litigation or arbitration.”256 Furthermore, the Board recognized the tension between the NLRA
and the FAA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Concepcion as “ensuring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”257
Despite this tension, the Board found that in the specific circumstances, enforcing the MAA
would impact the federal policy promoting collective action rights of employees more
significantly than not enforcing the MAA would impact the pro-arbitration policy for two
reasons.258 First, the Board’s holding is limited to a specific class, namely employers and
employees covered under the NLRA.259 Second, given the limited scope of the Board’s holding,
the concerns about interfering with the streamlined proceedings of arbitration were less likely to
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be present in a proceeding.260 Employment disputes are limited by the physical workplace,
where consumer disputes, such as those presented in Concepcion, are much larger.261 Due to the
smaller scale of employment disputes, they do not raise the same concerns about procedures as
were implicated in Concepcion.262 In the context of the MAA, these two elements combined to
favor the NLRA over the FAA.263
V: Horton goes to Court
The Board’s holding in Horton created a conflict within the Federal courts.264 More
specifically, many courts are not following the Board’s reasoning, and instead are enforcing
arbitration agreements comparable to the MAA in Horton.265 In contrast, other courts are finding
that class arbitration waiver provisions are unenforceable as an illegal restriction of Section 7
activity.266
A. Decisions Finding the Class Waivers Enforceable.
While numerous decisions in the lower courts since Horton have rejected its holding that
class waivers in employment agreements are unlawful employment practices, two decisions
provided in depth analysis regarding why the courts declined to follow the Board’s decision.
Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro,267 involved two plaintiffs who brought a class action for
various state law violations, including failure to provide meal and rest breaks, refusal to pay for

260

Id.
D.R Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at *15.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
See Horton Leads Courts to Disagree on Whom to Follow, 20 NO. 3 EMPLOYER’S GUIDE FAIR LAB. STANDARDS
ACT NEWSL. 3, Nov., 2012.
265
See, e.g. Delock v. Securitas Sec. Services USA, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL 3150391 (E.D. Ark.
Aug. 1, 2012). (holding that although the arbitration agreement constrained Section 7 activity, there was no
“contrary congressional command, and the FAA controls in a conflict between it and another statute if the result
would be to favor litigation over arbitration”); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 11-CV-05405-YGR,
2012 WL 1604851 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). (relying on Concepcion to find that class arbitration cannot be
required, because it interferes with “fundamental attributes of arbitration”).
266
See Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-BBC, 2012 WL 1242318 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012).
267
Morvant, 2012 WL 1604851at *1.
261

29

missed breaks, failure to pay overtime compensation that was due, and failure to provide
accurate wage statements.268 The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an
arbitration agreement that read, “[a]ny dispute arising out of or related to an Employee’s
employment with P.F. Chang’s” must be “resolved only by an arbitrator through final and
binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.” 269 It also contained a class waiver
stating, “there will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated” as
a class action.”270 The court held that the inclusion of a class waiver is not grounds to hold an
arbitration agreement unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 271 In reaching this decision the
court articulated a few reasons for declining to accept a public policy through the NLRA.272
First, the court found that the Board moved outside its area of expertise in reaching its
holding.273 The court also found that Gilmer exception preserving the “vindication of statutory
rights” only applies when the agreement to arbitrate precludes vindicating the right under which
a plaintiff brings suit.274

Finally, the court held that for a statute to preclude arbitration,

Congress must expressly override the FAA.275
Similarly, Delock v. Securitas Securities Services USA, Inc.,276 dealt with whether to
enforce an arbitration agreement, containing a class waiver similar to Horton and Morvant, over
claims arising under the FLSA.277

The Delock decision is more interesting than Morvant
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because the court deferred to the Section 7 reasoning of the Board.278 Despite the court’s finding
of a Section 7 restriction, it still chose to enforce the class waiver.279 First, the Delock court
criticized the Board’s historical argument, holding that the FAA was reenacted after the NLRA
was reenacted.280 As a result, the court reasoned that because the FAA was reenacted after the
NLRA, the NLRA’s provision repealing any previous existing contradictory laws does not
resolve any conflict between the statutes.281
The court then found that there is no “contrary congressional command,” as is required
by CompuCredit, to override the FAA.282 It discovered this through a multi-step process.283
First it analogized the NLRA’s protection of concerted activities to the FLSA’s provision
offering employees a statutory provision for proceeding with a collective action, which the
Gilmer court considered waivable.284 After that analogy, the Delock court held without further
discussion that the NLRA’s text was insufficient to resolve the dispute in favor of making the
class waiver unenforceable.285
While the text did not provide the “clear congressional command,” the court found that
there was a conflict between the purposes of the NLRA, collective action, and the FAA,
individual dispute arbitration, but that the NLRA must bend to the FAA for a few reasons. 286 As
a preliminary matter, the court noted that collective arbitration cannot be manufactured, and
relies on consent.287

Because class arbitration cannot be manufactured absent consent, any

collective legal action that was to proceed could not move forward in arbitration unless the
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agreement explicitly allowed it.288 As a result, the overall impact of finding the class waiver
unenforceable would lead to more litigation and less arbitration, which conflicts with the federal
policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution.289 Additionally, finding a class waiver unenforceable
would lead to a legal patchwork as it would treat individual employees seeking to assert statutory
rights differently merely because they joined a group.290 Lastly, it would have a far more
sweeping impact on the law than the Board suggested in Horton, because it would affect every
employment dispute as long as two employees make the complaint together.291 The Delock court
took an unusual step in affirming the Board’s Section 7 holding, yet enforcing the agreement
through finding that the FAA controlled in a conflict between the two statutory policies.292
B. Decision Finding the Class Waivers Unenforceable
In Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage. Corp.,293 the court decided not to enforce a class
waiver contained in an arbitration agreement.294 This case also involved a claim under the FLSA
and other state law claims.295

The court first held that although the NLRB generally has

exclusive jurisdiction to enforce §157 and 158 of the NLRA,296 a federal court has authority to
invalidate a contractual agreement that violates the NLRA.297 The court then deferred to the
Board’s finding that collective legal action to improve terms and conditions of employment is
covered by Section 7.298 In doing so, the court distinguished Concepcion because the preemption
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analysis299 does not apply when dealing with a federal statute.300 After finding the class waiver
unenforceable, the court held that because the provision was severable301 from the agreement, it
would still compel arbitration, but on a collective basis.302
C. Analysis of the Split in the District Courts
While not all courts have recognized this, the first step in analyzing whether the NLRA
makes an arbitration agreement unenforceable is whether it restricts activity protected by Section
7.303 The Morvant court did not consider whether there was a possible NLRA violation under
Section 8(a)(1), which leaves deficiencies in its holding.304 If there is no determination of
whether Section 7 protects joint or collective litigation, then the question of a violation of federal
law is never implicated. In contrast to the Morvant court, the Delock court found that the
Board’s reading of Section 7 was reasonable and therefore deferred.305 Similarly, the Herrington
Court also found that the Board’s interpretation of Section 7 was reasonable, though it was much
easier in that case because the defendant did not argue the issue. 306 Interestingly, to date,307 no
court has overturned the Board’s Section 7 holding.308 The Board’s Section 7 holding is central
to an analysis of the legality of a class waiver. Therefore, an analysis of the Board’s holding is
necessary.
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1. Section 7 Protects Joint or Collective Legal Action
In D.R. Horton, The Board rested its Section 7 holding on Supreme Court precedent that
expanded the area of employee protection outside the immediate employer-employee context and
specifically protected court action.309 While the Board made clear that some sort of joint or
collective legal action is protected by the NLRA, the Delock court goes even further giving
express protection to class action lawsuits, if filed in good faith by a group of employees to
achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment.310 The Section 7 issue is undisputed
in all of the cases. Each case involves a suit dealing with terms and conditions of employment
which satisfies the “mutual aid or protection” clause, and the class waiver means that it prohibits
suits by groups or by individuals acting on behalf of groups, satisfying the concerted action
requirement.311

Importantly, there is no authority on point that contradicts the Board’s

conclusion that the class waiver restricts action protected by Section 7.312
2. Section 8(a)(1) Compels a Finding that Class Waivers are Unlawful
After finding that an agreement violates Section 7, a reviewing court should next consider
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.313 It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights” guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA. 314
The arbitration agreements at issue in these cases restrain class or collective legal actions, which
are protected by Section 7.315 This makes such agreements an “unfair labor practice.”316 Thus,
federal courts are prohibited from enforcing the agreements, because federal courts are
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prohibited from enforcing private contracts that violate a federal statute.317
A federal court cannot exert its judicial power to enforce a contract that violates the
public policy of the United States as expressed through federal statutes.318

The activities

prohibited by the agreement are protected by Section 7.319 Section 8(a)(1) makes it unlawful for
an employer to restrict Section 7 activity.320 This part of the inquiry is where the facts of each
individual case begin to matter. If the arbitration agreement is unilaterally imposed by the
employer on the employees, then it is a work rule.321 What constitutes a mandatory arbitration
agreement is outside the scope of this note, but if the agreement does not itself constitute a term
or condition of employment, then the analysis would shift drastically. 322 Returning to a case of a
mandatory arbitration agreement that restricts Section 7 activity, it is clear that 8(a)(1) on its face
would make the agreement an unfair labor practice.323 Therefore, courts should be entering their
analyses of these arbitration provisions with the presumption that they unlawfully restrict federal
rights.324
Unfortunately some courts are confused because they have not begun from this set of
propositions.325 Morvant, for example, went off into discussions about whether the statutory
right being restricted is the one being sued under, and other issues that are not found within the
doctrine.326
The Delock court started with the finding of a Section 7 violation, but then proceeded to
317
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enforce the agreement finding that there was a conflict between the NLRA and FAA, and that the
NLRA must bend to the FAA, because the result of not enforcing the class waiver would be to
cause more litigation and less arbitration in conflict with the clear policy of the FAA.327 There
are two problems with this reasoning. First, enforcing the class waiver means more individual
dispute resolution and less collective action, which while not stated by the Delock court logically
flows from its decision.328 Second, the court ignores both of the crucial statutory sections,
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, and the savings clause of the FAA. The reasoning that the Delock
court applied is lifted very closely from Concepcion.329 Surprisingly, the Delock court did not
cite to Concepcion during its discussion of the disproportionate impact reasoning.330 Instead, the
court discussed the Board’s reading of the NLRA having the effect of leading to more litigation
and less arbitration, cited to the “strong federal policy promoting arbitration,” then held that the
FAA controlled the conflict.331
This pattern of analysis ignores the crucial question of whether these statutes even
conflict. Instead of jumping to the question of which statute controls in a conflict, these courts
skipped over the important question of whether these statutes can be read in a way where they do
not conflict. The Board fulfilled that role when it attempted to accommodate the statutes.332
The policy promoted by the FAA can be accommodated with the policies of the NLRA.
The FAA expressly includes a savings clause within it.333 The NLRA does not contain a savings
clause, but makes it clear that it intended to provide a non-waivable right when it makes attempts
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by an employer to restrict activities protected by Section 7 unlawful.334
By recognizing that agreements that restrict Section 7 rights are presumptively invalid
under the NLRA, cases involving compelled arbitration become much easier to decide. It is
clear that the Supreme Court has been interpreting the FAA broadly to enforce arbitration
agreements;335 however, the savings clause (save upon grounds such as exist at law or in equity)
clearly controls this dispute.336 The court has not yet held that an arbitration agreement is
enforceable if it restricts a federal statutory right.337 The court has not even held that an
arbitration agreement is enforceable if it restricts a state statutory right. The two closest cases
are Concepcion and CompuCredit;338 however, both cases are distinguishable.
Concepcion is likely the most sweeping pronouncement both of the purpose of the FAA
and its reach. At one point, the decision goes as far as stating, “the FAA’s preemptive effect
might extend even to grounds traditionally thought to exist” ‘at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.’339 While this language is clearly expansive, even the most sweeping
pronouncement of the FAA’s reach was limited to preemption.340 While in Concepcion, the
Court struck down a state judicial doctrine that found class action waivers unconscionable due to
their disproportionate effect on arbitration agreements;
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constitutional preemption under the Supremacy clause is not involved in the analysis. 342 Since
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violation of a federal law. Since the savings clause of the FAA says that agreements to arbitrate
disputes should be enforced “save upon grounds as exist at law” there is no reason that the
statutes need to be read to conflict.
The other case that may give pause on this dispute is CompuCredit. That case raised the
bar on what constitutes an unwaivable right under federal law.343 It made clear that classifying
something as a “right to sue” or using language that described judicial processes was insufficient
to rise to the level of a “contrary congressional command” necessary to preclude waiver of a
right to a judicial forum.344 The NLRA is quite distinct from the statute at issue in CompuCredit.
The Court went out of its way in CompuCredit to classify the “right to sue” as merely a
procedural right, or a type of forum selection.345 Unlike the Credit Repair Organizations Act,
both the Court and the Board described Section 7 as a substantive protection.346
This issue is uncharted water for the district courts. It does not fit into the previous
doctrine laid out by the court, but that is because the NLRA expressly provides an unwaivable
substantive right. Given that there is a federal law providing this right, the savings clause means
that the FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration is inapplicable. Just as the Court will not
enforce an illegal contract, it should not enforce an unlawful arbitration agreement. To hold
otherwise would be to eviscerate congressional intent as expressed through the savings clause.
VI: The Fifth Circuit Should Affirm the Board’s Decision
As of the writing of this Comment, the Board’s decision is currently under appeal in the
Fifth Circuit.347 The Fifth Circuit should affirm the Board’s decision in Horton because to
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overturn it would drastically change the law currently governing both arbitration and labor
relations. Enforcing the decision would be much more predictable given current precedent.
First, no Supreme Court decision has found that rights under a federal statute are subject to
waiver simply because an arbitration agreement is involved.348 Second, both the Board and the
Supreme Court have found that individual agreements that purport to waive labor rights are
unenforceable.349 The current dispute is between one statute that grants rights that cannot be
waived, and another statute that says agreements to follow a particular procedure to resolve
disputes should be enforced as long as they do not conflict with any other law. The statutes are
not in conflict.
While the broad language in Concepcion may give pause, the distinction between a state
judicial doctrine, where preemption analysis applies, and a federal statutory right, where
preemption analysis does not apply, is sufficient to truly distinguish these two cases.
Additionally, in finding that rights provided under federal statutes were subject to arbitration, the
courts classified the statutory provisions as forum selection clauses or procedural rights.350 At no
point has the Supreme Court upheld a waiver of a truly substantive right.351 While resolving
disputes collectively as opposed to individually may be perceived as a procedural right,
Congress’s intent, as evidenced by the statute, sought to protect collective activity over
individual activity because it felt that that the process of dispute resolution between employees
and employers would improve working conditions and therefore have a positive impact on
interstate commerce.352 The fact that some may now find that individual dispute resolution may
be more efficient and costly is not a sufficient reason to disregard Congress’s intent that in
348
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employment matters, the equalizing of bargaining positions is more important that the sanctity of
contract.
In Horton, the Board correctly applied the requisite steps to reach the proper conclusion.
First, employees have a Section 7 right to engage in collective legal action.353 Joint litigation is
concerted as well as class litigation that involves individual action seeking to initiate group
action.354 Since the proposed action in Horton was both concerted and directed at improving
workplace conditions, the conduct met the two prong test required under Section 7.355 Next, the
Board found that agreements to waive Section 7 rights are unenforceable because they conflicted
with a federal statutory policy,356 and are unlawful under Section 8(a)(1).357 The only element
left was to attempt to accommodate the statutory policies of the NLRA with the FAA.358
Here, the Board reached the correct decision that there is no conflict between its holding
that the MAA’s class waiver is a violation of Section 7, and the underlying purposes of the FAA
because of the savings clause within the FAA.359
The Fifth Circuit should affirm the Board’s reconciliation of the NLRA and the FAA
based on the Board’s decision. An agreement is unenforceable if an arbitration agreement would
violate the law due to the savings clause. Due to the MAA’s restriction of Section 7 activity by
an employer, the agreement is unlawful and unenforceable. Alternatively, Supreme Court FAA
jurisprudence will not enforce a waiver of rights contained in an arbitration agreement for which
Congress intended to preclude waiver, and Section 7 is one of those provisions.
FAA jurisprudence permitting enforcement of arbitration agreements makes clear that the
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agreement “may not require a party to ‘forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.”360
The Board distinguished Gilmer361 by clarifying that the agreement in question in that case did
not contain a class waiver.362 On its face, the MAA restricts legitimate Section 7 activity
because the employees were not allowed to engage in collective legal action on matters affecting
the terms and conditions of employment, which is the substantive right provided by the
NLRA.363 Unlike Gilmer, the MAA does not simply make a choice about a forum,364 but
restricts a substantive protection. Also unlike the ADEA involved in Gilmer, Congress’s intent
in passing the NLRA was to decrease positional bargaining inequality between employers and
employees.365 Thus, while in Gilmer the flexible and informal approach of arbitration was not in
conflict with the ADEA’s encouragement of conciliation,366 here the arbitral preference of
individual dispute resolution is in direct conflict with the NLRA’s preference for collective
action by employees so as to decrease the inequality in bargaining power.367
VI: Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court has consistently upheld arbitration agreements when it has
considered them, the Court has yet to rule that if an agreement violates federal law, it is
nonetheless enforceable. Because the savings clause makes Congress’s intent clear that if an
agreement is otherwise unlawful it is unenforceable, mandatory arbitration agreements
containing class waivers by employers restrict employees’ Section 7 rights and therefore are
unenforceable. The Fifth Circuit should clarify and simplify this area of the law and enforce the
Board’s decision in D.R. Horton.
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